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[L. A. No. 19671. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1947.]

MURIEL G. BOWMAN, Respondent, v. HARRY P.
BOWMAN, Appellant.
[1] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - Discretion of Oourt. - The
amount of support which a divorced husband must pay is
within the discretion of the trial court, and the court, in making the award, must consider the circumstances of the parties,
the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay.
(Civ. Code, § 189.)
(I] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-While support money awarded in
• divorce action should normally be paid directly to the wife,
the trial court may order the sums paid to a trustee for the
benefit of the wife.

[1] See 1 Oal.Jur.l012; 17 Am.Jur. 467.
licK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 206; [2] Divorce, 1198;
[3] Appeal and Error, §l071; [4] Divorce, § 204; [5J Judgments,
§ 185; [6,8] Jucigments,I130; [7] Judgments, 1149; [9] Divorce,
§216.
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[3] Appeal-Persons Entitled to Allege Errors-Errors Not InJuriously Affecting Appella.nt.-The fact that the eourt in •
divorce action direeted a trustee, to whom support money was
paid for the benefit of the wife, to apply the money to the
payment of debts, thereby restricting her in the ue thereof,
cannot be objected to hy thf' lm!'lband on an'!'lf'1I1. II!'! ht'! i!'l not
injured thereby.
['] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - J?leading.-.A.n interlocutory
decree requiring alimony payments to a trustee for the benefit
of the wife was not void because the wife did not request
alimony in her prayer where she clearly stated in her eomplaint that she and defendant were liable for certain debts and
in her prayer requested that defendant be ordered to pay them,
and where, in the absence of agreement or sumcient eommunity property, it was necessary to award ber alimony in
order to give her the required relief.
[6] J'udgment&-Opening and Vacating-'1'ime for Application.A trial court may not relieve a defendant from the entry of
a default when the motion under Code Civ. Proa., § 473, wu
not made within six months after the entry of default.
[8] Id.--Change or Amendment.-Where a judgment was rendered
precisely as intended by the trial judge, its modification can·
not be based on the power of the trial eourt, under Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, or independently of it, to cO'l"l"ect clerical erron
made either by the clerk or by the court.
[7] ld. - Opening and Vacating--Constrnction of Statute.-Th~
purpose of that portion of Code Civ. Prac., § 473, providing
that a trial court may relieve a party from "a judgment, order
or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect .•." is to enable
trial courts to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding in
order to allow the party to proceed on the merits rather than
to allow him to be defeated by a determination or proceeding
eatu!ed by his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
[Sa, 8'b] ld.--Change or Amendment.-Trial eourts can modify or
amend their judgments only as prescribed by statute, and a
lUDlJIlary modification of judgments to correct errors of law is
not authorued by Code Civ. Proc., § 473.
[9] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Termination of Allowance.A trial eourt has power to terminate payments of support and
maintenance in a proper case and ou a proper sbowing.

[8] See 2 Oal.Jnr. 840; 3 Am.Jnr. '"'
[7] See 14 OaLJnr.10lL
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APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County and from an order restoring certain provisions stricken from an interlocutory judgment.
Kurtz Kauffman and John Beardsley, Judges. Affinned.
Vincent Scott for Appellant.
Nicholas & Davis and Harry R. Roberts for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-'l'hese appeals are from an order of the
superior court restoring certain provisions previously struck
from an interlocutory decree of divorce and from a final judgment of divorce containing the restored provisions. Plaintiff
brought an action for divorce on April 13, 1944, requesting
support for her child. She also alleged that the parties were
indebted to a credit uIlion and owed money secured by a
mortgage on a house and lot fonnerly owned by them as joint
tenants, which became the separate property of plaintiff by
a quitclaim dced executed by the defendant before the divorce
action. Plaintiff requested that defendant be required to pay
these debts and also that the community property, amounting to about $1,000, be distributed. Defendant, an attorney,
was personally served with process but his default was entered on May 17, 1944.
Plaintiff stated at the trial that she did not seek alimony
for herself, but that she wished defendant to pay the foregoing debts. The interlocutory judgment of divorce, providing for the distribution of the community property, was
granted. The trial court granted custody of the child to
plaintiff and then ordered:
"3. That the defendant pay to the Court Trustee, for the
benefit of plaintiff and said minor child, the following
amounts each month, to-wit:
"(a) The sum of $50.00 payable $25.00 on the :first day
of the month, and $25.00 on the fifteenth day of the month,
for the support of said minor child, Donald Michael Bowman;
"(b) The sum of $54.05 on the first day of each month for
payment to Syndicate Mortgage Company to be applied on
the mortgage on the home place of the parties, until said
Loan shall have been paid in full;
" (c) The sum of $43.00 on the first day of each month
,for payment to Los Angeles Teachers Credit Union to be
lapplied on the promissory note payable to said Teachers
ICredit Union until it has been paid in full."
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Defendant did not appeal from this judgment. Within six
months after it was entered, but not within six months after
the entry of the default, he made a motion to open, vacate or
modify the judgment. This motion was granted to the extent
that the words "for the benefit of plaintUf and said minor
child" were struck from the decree. Plaintiff did not appeal
from this modification but later made a motion requesting th('
restoration of the words Rtruek from the interlocutory decree.
This motion was granted and the final judgment of divorce
was entered in the same words as the interlocutory decree.
The payments in question are declared to be for the benefit
of plaintiff and her child and, since they will serve to provide
them with the unobstructed use of their home and household
furniture, they must be regarded as provisions for support and
maintenance. [1] The amount of support that the husband
must pay is within the discretion of the trial court (8cMt"b. v.
Seheibe, 57 Cal.App.2d 336, 343 [134 P.2d 835]) and the
court, in making the award, must consider the circumstances
of the parties, the needs of the wife and the ability of the
husband to pay. (Civ. Code, § 139.) [2] Defendant oemtends, however, that the provisions ordering installment payments are void because the payments are to be made to the
court trustee. He relies upon eases declaring that orders for
payment to a person not a party to the action are beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. (Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 322
[18 P.2d 338]; Stevens v. Stevens, 215 Cal. 702, 704 [12 P.2d
432]; Samter v. Klopstock. Realty Co., 31 Cal.App.2d 532,
535 [88 P.2d 250); OvereZl v. Overell, 18 CaI.App.2d 499,
502 [64 P'2d 483].) The court trustee, however, was not an
agent of the creditors but a trustee for plaintiff and her minor
child. (Bohnert v. Bohnert, 91 Cal. 428, 432 [27 P. 732].)
The sums to be paid to the court trustee were determined by
the amounts of the debt installments and are to be paid until
the debts are satisfied. Support normally should be paid
directly to the wife (Nathan v. Nathan, 102 Neb. 59 [165
N.W. 955]; Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 306 [121 P. 19, Ann.Cas.
1914D 989, 38 L.R.A.N.S. 269]; see 2 Nelson on Divorce,
§ 14.69), but the trial court may order the sums paid to a
trustee for the benefit of the wife. (Nemecheck v. Nemecheck,
250 Mich. 641 [231 N.W. 82]; Yost v. Yost, 143 Neb. 80 I8
N.W.2d 686] ; Mosey v. Hiestand [Ohio App.] 42 N.E.2d lR6;
see 2 Nelson on Divorce, § 14.69.) [3] The court directed
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the trustee to apply the sums to the payment of the debts,
thereby restricting plaintiff in the use thereof, but she did
not appeal and defendant cannot show that he is injured by
the restriction. (Bohnert v. Bohnert, supra, at 432.) Defendant is liable for the debts as well as plaintiff and the
appointment of a trustee, with directions, constituted a benefit to him also, since he was thereby assured that the payments would be made to the creditors and not otherwise
d.isposed of by plaintiff.
[4] Defendant contends that the parts of the interlocutory decree requiring alimony payments to the trustee are
void because plaintiff did not request alimony in her prayer.
Plaintiff clearly stated in her complaint that she and defendant was liable for certain debts and in her prayer she
requested that defendant be ordered to pay them. Although this was not a formal prayer for alimony, it was
manifestly a request for relief that would give her and her
child the unobstructed use of the home and household furniture. Plaintiff did not wish ordinary support for herself
but she wanted the debts paid. In the absence of agreement
or sufficient community property, it was necessary to a,varu
her alimony in order to give her the required relief. The
complaint was sufficient notice to defendant that plaintiff
might be granted this relief. Plaintiff need not rely solely
upon the sufficiency of her complaint and prayer, however,
since it is established that if the relief in excess of prayer is
alimony, the judgment, although erroneous, is not void.
(Parker v. Parker, 203 Cal. 787, 792 [266 P. 283]; Cohen
v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 102 [88 P. 267, 11 Ann.Cas. 520].)
Defendant contends that he properly attacked the interlocutory judgment on the ground that the judgment exceeded
the relief prayed for and that he was given relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is now final.
since plaintiff did not appeal. Defendant gave notice of a
motion to "Open, vacate or modify the default judgment or
default" within six months after the entry of the judgment,
but not within six months after the entry of the default. He
stated therein that the judgment had been taken against him
by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and.
further. that the decree was erroneous in so far as it awarded
alimony unsupported by appropriate allegations in plaintiff's
complaint and prayer. In his affidavit of merits, defendant
stated that plaintUI and her attorney had misled him and also

..
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that, in defaulting, he had relied upon section 580 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, believing that no alimony would be
awarded 80 long as none had been requested. Upon the hearing of the motion, both parties being represented, the trial
court ordered ". . . Motion is granted in part as follows:
the words 'for the benefit of plaintiff and said minor child'
. . . are stricken. Motion is otherwise denied." The trial
court did not, however, disturb that part of the decree ordering defendant to pay the installments to the court trustee.
Thus, the trial court attempted to change a part of the decree
80 that instead of awarding alimony it provided for payments
to the court trustee, apparently as part of a division of property. This change amounted to an amendment of the judgment in order to correct a supposed error of law.
[5] The trial court could not relieve defendant from the
entry of the default because the motion under section 473
was not made within six months after the entry of default.
(Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Ca1.2d 913, 917 [156 P.2d 25]; Hu~t,
Mirk & Co., Inc. v. Hesperides Mini~g Co., 200 Cal. 882, 384
[253 P. 317]; Title Ins. & T. Co. v. King etc. Co., 162 Cal.
44,46 [120 P. 1066].) [6] Defendant states, however, that
he was not attacking the entry of default, but was seeking a
modification of the judgment to make it correspond to the
relief requested by plaintiff in her complaint. Defendant
concedes that the interlocutory judgment was rendered precisely as intended by the trial judge. The modification of the
judgment, therefore, cannot be based upon the power of the
trial court, under section 473 or independent of it, to correct
clerical errors made either by the clerk or by the court.
(Bastajia~ v. Brown, 19 Cal.2d 209, 214 [120 P.2d 9].)
[7] Section 473 also provides that a trial court may relieve
a party from "a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect. . . . " The purpose of this provision, however, is to enable trial courts to set aside the judgment, order
or proceeding in order to allow the party to proceed on the
merits rather than to allow him to be defeated by a determination or proceeding caused by his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. (Riskin v. Towors, 24 Cal.2d 274,
279 [148 P.2d 611, 153 A.L.R. 442] j Estate of Simmom, 168
Cal. 390, 396 [143 P. 697].) The trial court in the present
case did not attempt to vacate the judgment on the ground
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of surprise or inadvertence, but attempted to grant defendant's request by modifying the interlocutory judgment to
correct the supposed error of law. [Sa] Trial courts can
modify or amend their judgments only as prescribed by statute
and the summary modification of judgments to correct errors
of law is not authorized by section 473. The purported change
in the interlocutory judgment was therefore void. (Steve us
v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 110, 112, 114 [59 P.2d 988];
Lankton v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.2d 694,696 [55 P.2d 1170];
Estate of Potter, 141 Cal. 424, 426 [75 P. 850]; First Nat.
Bank v. DU1/, 110 Cal. 69, 78 [42 P. 476]; Felton C1umical
Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.2d 622, 628 [92 P2d. 684];
see GZougie v. GZougie, 174 Cal. 126, 130 [162 P. 118];
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 124 Ca1. 422, 426 [57 P. 225J; D1/erville Mfg. Co. v. HelZer, 102 Cal. 615, 617 [36 P. 928].)
Defendant contends that even if a court is without authority
to amend its judgment to correct errors of law, it bas continuing jurisdiction, under section 139 of the Civil Code, to
modify its support decrees. [9] It is no longer seriously
questioned that a trial court bas power to terminate payments
of support and maintenance in a proper ease and upon ::
proper showing. (McClure v. McClure, 4 Cal.2d 356, 360 [49
P.2d 584, 100 A.L.R. 1257J.) [8b] In the present case,
defendant's notice of motion was based upon the two grounds
mentioned above, i.e., surprise and relief in excess of prayer.
The notice of motion was accompanied by defendant's affidavit, a proposed answer and an affidavit executed by his
attorney. Defendant's affidavit stated facts showing surprise
and alleged that the relief afforded plaintiff was contrary to
section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He alleged further that his attorney had advised him that he bad a valid
and substantial defense to the action. His attorney's affidavit
was entitled "Affidavit Supporting Motion to Vacate Judgment." The trial court, upon the hearing of the motion,
ordered the words "for the benefit of plaintiff and said minor
child" struck from the interlocutory decree, but did not disturb that part of the decree ordering defendant to pay the
installments to the court trustee. (McClure v. McClure, supra,
at 360.) The trial court apparently attempted to convert a,
judgment for alimony into a division of property. There is'
nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge made I,
bis decision after considering the cireumstances of the parties. !
In fact, the order of the court purports to retain, in the inter-:
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locutory decree, that part requiring defendant to pay the
contested sums. The court decided merely that it would be
erroneous to require him to pay the sums as support and
maintenance. It is clear that the trial court tnade an attempt
to rectify a supposed error of law on summary motion
procedure not allowed by statute. (Lankton v. Superior Court,
.upra, at 596; StetJens v. Superior Court, npra, at 113;
Holtum v. Grief, 144 Cal. 521, at 526 r78 P. 11].)
Subsequent to the purported amendment of the interlocutory judgment, plaintiff gave notlce of a motion to restore the judgment to its original form. Upon hearing, the
trial court ordered that the interlocutory decree be restored
to its original form, and the final judgment of divorce was
then entered in the words of the original interlocutory
judgment of divorce. It is from this order and judgment
that defendant appealed. The trial court was correct in
enterin~ the final judgment in accord with the language of
the interlocutory decree since the purported modification
of that decree was without authority.
The order appealed from and the final judgment of divorce are 8ffinnoo.
Gibson,C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., did not participate herein.
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